Strategizing against No-regret Learners

arXiv — cs.LGWednesday, November 12, 2025 at 5:00:00 AM
The study on strategizing against no-regret learners reveals important insights into game theory, particularly regarding how players can maximize their utility when facing adaptive opponents. It establishes that under certain conditions, players can guarantee a utility at least equal to the Stackelberg equilibrium. However, when the no-regret learner has only two actions, players cannot exceed this utility. In contrast, with more than two actions, players can achieve a strictly higher utility, especially when the no-regret learner employs a mean-based strategy. The characterization of optimal gameplay against such learners is framed as a control problem, providing a structured approach to strategy formulation. This research not only contributes to theoretical understanding but also has practical implications for designing competitive algorithms in various fields, including artificial intelligence and economics.
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